
The
New ADA
by:
Christopher E. Hogan
Newhouse, Prophater, Letcher & Moots, LLC
Tel: (614) 255-5441
The new year has ushered in a stunning sea change in federal disability
law. Signed in to law in late September 2008 and made effective Jan.
1, 2009, the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) is a congressional
clarion call directing the courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to “restore the intent and protections” of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), particularly with
reference to who falls within the ADA’s protective ambit. The ADAAA
is therefore likely to cause, in both ADArelated compliance and litigation,
a paradigm shift away from questions of coverage to questions of
accommodation and discrimination. After placing the ADAAA in context,
this article will
outline its most significant provisions.
An edifice undone
The ADAAA
overturns an intellectual edifice built largely over the last 10
years by the U.S. Supreme Court, the cornerstones of which are four
of the Court’s decisions narrowing the ADA in two fundamental ways.
In 1999, the Court issued its decisions in Sutton
v. United Airlines, Inc., Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, and Murphy
v. United States Parcel Service, Inc., collectively holding that so-called mitigating
measures, such as medication and the body’s natural adaptation to
certain impairments, should be taken into account when determining
whether an individual is disabled under the ADA.1 Three years later
in Toyota Motor Manufacturing v.Williams, the Court construed the
ADA’s requirement that for an impairment to “substantially limit”
a major life activity, it must encroach upon activities of “central
importance to most people’s daily lives.”2 Underpinning the Court’s
rationale was its reliance on legislative intent. “That these terms
need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding
standard for qualifying as disabled is confirmed by the first section
of the ADA, which lays out the legislative findings and purposes
that motivate the Act.”3
Over the next half-decade, these rulings cut a path to the ADA’s
protections that some decried as overly narrow, while others applauded
the decisions as a necessary canalization that prevented the ADA’s
protections from spilling over on to relatively minor medical conditions
and defects of character. Now the
ADAAA settles the debate in favor of the former by calling for more
robust coverage, by legislatively overruling the aforementioned Supreme
Court precedent and by directing the EEOC to revise key portions
of its regulations interpreting the ADA.
ADAAA at a glance
The ADAAA does not disturb the ADA’s definition of “disability.”
To qualify for protection under the ADA as amended, an employee
of a covered employer must still demonstrate that he or she has
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities, has a record of such impairment or
is regarded as having such impairment.4 The ADAAA calls for the
more liberal interpretation of the key terms and adds examples
that broaden the definition’s scope.
Major life activities
Of the key terms expanded by the ADAAA is the ADA’s definition of
“major life activities.” Congress did not define the term in the
ADA, leaving that task to the EEOC. The EEOC’s regulations currently
set forth a non-exhaustive list of major life activities, including
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning and working.5 The ADAAA adds to this
list in two ways.
First, the ADAAA identifies major life activities
that the EEOC has not specifically recognized and which have the
potential to expand the application of the ADA. Among those are
learning, reading, bending and communicating.6 Second, the ADAAA
adds a subclass of major life activities under the rubric of “major
bodily functions.” Included in this subclass are “functions of
the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder,
neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine and reproductive
functions.”7 The ADAAA’s rejection of the Supreme Court decision
inWilliams also portends a loosening of the standard for determining
when one or more life activities become “major” in scope.
Along
with its expansion of the class of covered major life activities,
the ADAAA broadens the sweep of the ADA by calling for a less restrictive
interpretation of what it means to be substantially
limited in a major life activity.
Substantial limitation
In the wake of the ADAAA, the term “substantially limits” will be
recast to require an impairment to impose a considerably lower
degree of restriction on a major life activity. The EEOC regulation
interpreting the ADA currently construe the phrase “substantially
limits” to mean that an individual must be unable to perform or significantly
restricted in performing a major life activity as compared to an
average person in the general population.8 In the ADAAA, Congress
finds this construction “inconsistent with congressional intent,
by expressing too high a standard,” and expresses its “expectation”
that the EEOC will “revise that portion of its current regulations[.]”9 Thus, one can expect the EEOC to issue revised regulations and enforcement
guidance on what it means to be substantially limited in performing
a major life activity. Such revisions are likely to have a ripple
effect that will result in revisions to other regulations and enforcement
guidance.
Mitigating measures
In addition to legislatively overruling Sutton, Albertson’s
and Murphy, the ADAAA makes clear that mitigating measures
are not to be considered in determining whether an impairment substantially
limits a major life activity.10 Thus, individuals with impairments
whose limitations are largely ameliorated by medication, assistive
technology or the body’s natural adaptations can nonetheless be found
to be
substantially limited in a major life activity. The ADAAA carves
out an exception for ordinary eyeglasses and contact lenses, the
mitigating effects of which can be considered in determining whether
an individual has a covered disability. As a result, individuals
requiring glasses or contact lenses to fully correct their vision
are unlikely to be covered by the ADA. Episodic or remitting conditions
An impairment that is episodic or in remission qualifies as a covered
disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity
when active.11 Therefore, the lines of precedent holding that individuals
with conditions such as cancer are not necessarily covered by the
ADA when those conditions are in full remission will have to be redrawn.
“Regarded as” claims Perhaps just as significant as the ADAAA’s widening
of the definition of covered impairments is its expansion of protections
for those perceived as having a disability. No longer will applicants
or employees asserting such claims be required to demonstrate that
they were perceived as having an impairment that would substantially
limit a major life activity. Instead, those asserting “regarded as”
claims need only show that they were subjected to an adverse employment
action because of “an actual or perceived mental or physical impairment
whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major
life activity.” The sole exclusion to this astonishing expansion
of ADA liability is impairments that are both “transitory and minor,”
which is defined to mean impairments with an actual or expected duration
of “6 months or less.”12 Applicants or employees covered only under
the “regarded as” prong of the ADA are not entitled to reasonable
accommodations—though such failure to accommodation claims have always
been a relatively minor constellation in the universe of ADA litigation.
Reverse discrimination
Other than relieving covered employers of the obligation to accommodate
applicants or employees with perceived impairments, the only limiting
principle to be found in the ADAAA is its pre-emption of claims
of reverse discrimination. The ADAAA makes clear that the ADA does
not countenance claims that an applicant or employee was subjected
to discrimination because of such individual’s lack of a disability.13 This presumably includes claims by nondisabled workers that disabled
workers are receiving special treatment. These provisions present
interesting questions concerning the future of so-called affirmative
action programs aimed at the disabled.
A new era
By expanding the classes of covered conditions and extending coverage
to individuals whose conditions are in remission or asymptomatic;
whose conditions are ameliorated by medication, assistive technology
or the body’s natural adaptations; and who are perceived as being
impaired in a way that is not “transitory and minor,” the ADAAA
is likely to make ADA compliance and litigation the epicenter of
the federal law of the workplace. The ADA’s powerful gravitational
pull is likely to change the orbits of state law as well. With
such broad coverage, particular emphasis will be placed on the
interactive process, identifying congruent reasonable accommodations
and the care with which individuals with conditions such as learning
disabilities are treated.14
Endnotes
1. 1527 U.S. 471 (1999), 527 U.S. 555 (1999), 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
To be sure, the Court noted that if the mitigating measure had
side effects, those effects should also be taken into account in
determining
whether the individual remains substantially limited in a major life
activity. Thus, courts were directed to determine whether an individual
was substantially limited in a major life activity after taking into
account the impact—both positive and negative— of any mitigating
measures.
2. 534 U.S. 184 (2002); id. at 534 U.S. at 198.
3. Id. at 197 (citing 42 U.S.C. §12101).
4. 42 U.S.C. §12102(2).
5. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(i).
6. S. 3406 at §3(2)(A). Because the ADAAA has not yet been codified,
citations are to the Senate Bill signed into law.
7. Id. at §3(2)(B).
8. 29 CFR §1630.2(j).
9. S. 3406 at §2(a)(8), and at §2(b)(6).
10. Id. at §3(E).
11. Id. at §3(D).
12. Id. at §3(A) and at Sec. 3(B).
13. Id. at §6(g).
14. For more on the interactive process, see Hogan, Christopher,
“Guidelines for ADA Accommodation Dialogues,” Ohio Lawyer, Vol. 19,
No. 6.
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